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A B S T R A C T   
The global moral appeal of human rights and democratic governance appears to be in severe crisis. In both the 
Global North and the South, many countries have witnessed the rise of racist, sexist, and illiberal politicians into 
the highest positions in the government. As one of Asia’s oldest electoral democracies, the Philippines is not an 
exception in this global pattern of decline in civil liberties and democratic governance. Considering the case of 
the Philippines, this article addresses the following core question: How and under which conditions do contes-
tations as well as legitimations of the Duterte regime emerge across domestic and transnational spaces? This 
article examines the transnational and domestic contestations and legitimations of the Duterte regime based on a 
spatially-oriented analysis of the official results of the 2016 and 2019 elections, while demonstrating the mul-
tispatial contestations against and in support of global human rights and liberal democratic norms. While the role 
of geography and spatialization in the formation of illiberal and authoritarian politics remains underappreciated, 
this article contributes to the disciplinary fields of political geography, comparative politics, and International 
Relations. Specifically, the article deploys a spatial approach in understanding the territorially-contingent pat-
terns of contestations and legitimations of liberal democratic politics.   
1. Introduction 
The global moral appeal of human rights and democratic governance 
appears to be in severe crisis. In both the Global North and the South, 
many countries have witnessed the rise of racist, sexist, and illiberal 
politicians into the highest positions in the government. These politi-
cians and their allies continue to challenge constitutionally guaranteed 
norms of democratic governance, peaceful political dissent, and human 
rights protection including marginalized minority groups. The US-based 
Freedom House reported in 2019 that global freedoms have significantly 
declined for the 13th consecutive year, and a wide variety of countries 
experienced such a deterioration, ranging from supposedly consolidated 
democracies such as the United States to authoritarian regimes such as 
Russia (Freedom House, 2019). 
In Southeast Asia, home to almost 500 million people, the three 
largest electoral democratic countries —Indonesia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines— have recently witnessed deterioration of its democratic 
institutions, persistent threats to human rights, and the amplification of 
anti-democratic discourses in mainstream public sphere (Dressel & 
Bonoan, 2019; Regilme, 2016, 2018a, 2018a; Thompson, 2019). As one 
of Asia’s oldest electoral democracies, the Philippines is not an 
exception in this global pattern of decline in civil liberties and demo-
cratic governance (Regilme, 2016). Even before the tenure of Donald 
Trump as the 45th President of the United States, Rodrigo Duterte was 
elected as the President of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 
2016, after the end of Benigno Aquino III’s presidency. 
Benigno Aquino III, whose parents were widely credited as heroes of 
the 1986 People Power Revolution that toppled the two-decade 
authoritarian regime, is widely known for his commitment to liberal 
democracy and fundamental human rights. Yet, the rise of Duterte to the 
presidency is quite unexpected, considering that his decades-long career 
in provincial politics suggests a mixed record concerning his democratic 
credentials (Regilme & Untalan, 2016). Before the presidency, Duterte 
served for almost three decades as the Mayor of Davao City, which is the 
third-most populous city in the Philippines and the largest city in terms 
of territorial mandate. During his time as city mayor, Duterte was known 
for deploying intensified state violence that was supposed to foster peace 
and order in his city. Although the 1987 Philippine Constitution 
explicitly prohibits the use of state-sanctioned death penalty and up-
holds the sanctity of the due process of the law, then-Mayor Duterte has 
been widely criticized for his alleged involvements in extrajudicial 
killings of minors, homeless people, and suspected criminals in Davao. 
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Those killings were conducted by a state-sponsored vigilante group 
called Davao Death Squad (DDS), whose members were allegedly linked 
to Duterte. Many critics blame Duterte and the DDS as responsible for 
the deaths of around 700 to 1000 civilians between the period 
1998–2008 (Regilme, 2021). 
Under the Duterte presidency, various state-sponsored agents sys-
tematically killed thousands of civilians in the context of the ‘war on 
drugs’ (Johnson & Fernquest, 2018; Regilme, 2020; Simangan, 2018). 
When asked about the war on drugs, Duterte proudly expressed that 
“Hitler massacred three million Jews. Now there are three million drug 
addicts … I’d be happy to slaughter them.” (Coonan, 2016, p. 2). 
Duterte, in his bellicose and often obscene political rhetoric, has 
consistently expressed his disgust for democratic institutions, peaceful 
political dissidence, and constitutionally-guaranteed human rights 
(Associated Press, 2016; Holmes, 2016; Reyes, 2019). 
How is it possible that a country that has a relatively rich experience 
with democratic institutions suddenly elects and supports a presidential 
administration that has blatantly backtracked from the core democratic 
identity of the nation? How and under which conditions do contesta-
tions and legitimations of the Duterte regime emerge across domestic 
and transnational spaces? In contrast to mainstream scholarly and 
public discourses claiming that there is overwhelmingly consolidated 
support for Duterte, I map out the temporal and spatial distribution of 
political support of as well as opposition to the Duterte presidency and 
examines the macro-social mechanisms that were used to consolidate 
the Duterte regime. I argue that the contestations and legitimation ef-
forts of Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian regime emerged from 
various local, national, and transnational spaces. I showed that the 
electoral victory of Duterte in 2016 cannot be fully attributed to an 
overwhelming public approval of an illiberal and authoritarian agenda. 
Based on the official results of the 2016 presidential elections and the 
2019 midterm elections as well as Duterte’s legitimation tactics in the 
transnational public sphere, I investigate the basis of political support 
for illiberal and authoritarian politics in the Philippines. 
This article is based on the following organizational logic. The next 
section briefly reviews the scholarship on comparative democratiztaion 
and Duterte’s politics, underscores the analytic weaknesses of the rele-
vant literature, and discusses the importance of spatialization and place- 
based analysis in understanding contemporary challenges of authori-
tarianism. The empirical section is divided into three parts. The first part 
discusses the plausible sources of Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian 
power based on the geographical distribution of votes during the 2016 
presidential elections, while the second part investigates the patterns of 
votes in support of Duterte’s allies based on the 2019 midterm national 
and local elections. The third part situates the Duterte presidency in the 
broader transnational politics of democratic decline vis-à-vis the rise of 
illiberal and authoritarian power. I conclude by highlighting broader 
implications of this study to the emerging debates on authoritarianism, 
political geography, and International Relations. 
2. The puzzle: spatializing illiberal and authoritarian politics 
A nation of around 110 million, the Philippines emerged as the first 
country in the Southeast Asian region that transitioned successfully in 
1986 from authoritarianism to electoral-liberal democracy (Regilme, 
2016). Since the ratification of the 1987 Philippine constitution, six 
duly-elected Presidents have taken turns, including the incumbent 
President Rodrigo Duterte. Remarkably, Philippine democracy, even 
before the time of Duterte, has suffered from systemic flaws, ranging 
from extreme wealth inequalities to the persistent violent conflict 
involving state agents vis-a-vis non-state armed rebels (Bello et al., 
2004; Regilme, 2016). Aside from his excessive use of abusive language 
and public tantrums, Duterte has clearly defied liberal democratic norms 
such as his endorsement of extrajudicial killings, unwavering public 
support for the Marcos family (whose ill-gotten wealth during the era of 
dictatorship has yet to be fully recovered by the state), and the 
unwavering campaign to restore death penalty (Macaraeg, 2019). 
This article addresses the following puzzle: Where does Duterte’s 
support base come from? How and under which conditions do contes-
tations and legitimations of the Duterte regime emerge across domestic 
and transnational spaces? Considering space constraints, I provide 
exploratory arguments concerning the spatial and political bases for the 
endurance and limits of Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian politics. 
Defying simplistic generalizations often found in mainstream media and 
Philippine studies literature, the core argument states that Duterte’s 
political base of support base varies across geographical spaces within 
and beyond the Philippine archipelago and over time. This variation can 
be explained by using temporal and spatial frames, and those frames, 
unfortunately, have been largely ignored by the dominant scholarship 
on authoritarian politics, in general, and on the rise of Duterte, in 
particular. First, during the 2016 national presidential elections, Duterte 
emerged as the winner, with 38.6% of the total votes, with the largest 
vote contributions emanating from the greater Metro Manila region and 
Mindanao in southern Philippines. I demonstrate that the Duterte 
presidential campaign deployed a justificatory narrative that advocates 
for exceptionalist politics of violence, particularly by legitimizing 
extraordinary measures of state violence as extremely necessary for 
peace and economic development. Second, the 2019 midterm elections 
delivered a landslide win for many Duterte allies in Congress (Senate 
and House Representatives) and local government positions, which can 
be explained by two factors: (1) the convergence of mainstream political 
parties’ conditional support for Duterte due to fear of political retalia-
tion, and (2) the systematic state repression of political dissent that 
systematically paralyzed the emergence of a broad and credible oppo-
sition coalition. Third, the article analyzes, in broad strokes, how 
Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian politics has been legitimized and 
contested in the transnational public sphere. 
Amidst the global decline of democratization and the surging elec-
toral victory of far-right politicians (Lührmann et al., 2019), Rodrigo 
Duterte appears amongst the growing roster of world leaders, who 
openly defy liberal democratic principles. Those principles include 
democratic checks and balances on the power of the government’s ex-
ecutive branch, constitutionally guaranteed human rights, toleration of 
peaceful political dissent, and political equality of all citizens (regardless 
of gender, ethnic background, religion, and other personal 
identity-markers). How can we classify the Duterte regime in terms of its 
procedural and the ideational-substantive properties? Procedural aspects 
pertain to the governance processes of the state’s executive adminis-
tration, particularly in how it manages and negotiates the contestations, 
demands, deliberations, and social mobilizations amongst competing 
political actors within and beyond the state’s claimed political terri-
tories. As Schumpeter (1947, 269) notes, the procedural component of 
democracy refers to the “institutional arrangement for arriving at po-
litical discussions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. In contrast, 
ideational-substantive properties refer to the ideological, normative, 
and justificatory beliefs and principles that underpin the ruling gov-
ernment’s exercise of power over its subjects. Whereas the procedural 
component refers to the question of how governments deploy its power, 
ideational-substantive element raises the question of why governments 
behave the way they do. Rainer Forst (2017, 12–18; 21) calls the 
ideational-substantive realm as the ‘normative order’, whereby he em-
phasizes the ‘justificatory’ nature of humans as political beings and the 
role of justifications in governing communities. I argue, however, that a 
careful analysis of both the material and ideational-substantive contes-
tations of a governing body’s legitimacy has to be seriously considered. 
Considering Forst’s (2017) emphasis on ideational justifications and 
Schumpeter’s (1947) focus on procedural elements, I conduct instead a 
more holistic examination of Duterte’s politics by referring to what I call 
as its regulative order, or the collective bundle of normative justifications, 
rules, institutions, and mechanisms of why, how, and under which 
conditions governmental power is exercised. 
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Several scholars have proposed various descriptive terms to under-
stand Duterte politics: populist regime (Arugay & Slater, 2019; McCoy, 
2017; Pernia, 2019; Tenorio et al., 2020); illiberal ‘law-and-order’ 
regime (Thompson 2016); fascist regime (Bello, 2017); an outlaw, 
dependent on social bandit-like morality (Kusaka, 2017); dismantled 
liberal constitutional order (Dressel & Bonoan, 2019); emerging 
oligarchic democracy (Regilme, 2019a, p. 14); and genocidal in nature 
(Simangan 2017). None of the aforementioned terms, however, pro-
ductively capture the ideational and procedural aspects of Duterte’s 
political regime, or more precisely, its regulative order. As Marlies Glasius 
(2018, 517) maintains: “authoritarian practices primarily constitute a 
threat to democratic processes, while illiberal practices are primarily a 
human rights problem”. The term authoritarian primarily captures 
Duterte’s attempts to curtail the openness of the political system as well 
as to prevent the dispersion of power amongst the branches of the state 
and within the public sphere. Yet, invoking the notion of authoritarian 
alone does not neatly capture the ideational foundations of the regime’s 
human rights problems, thereby requiring the careful interrogation of 
the Duterte administration’s discourses and policy record on liberalism 
(or the lack thereof). 
I classify the Duterte regime as an illiberal and authoritarian regime. 
On its ideational-substantive aspects, the regime is illiberal due to its 
ambivalent, if not resistant, stance on individual freedoms and the 
dignity of the human person regardless of their socio-economic back-
ground. For instance, the administration’s genocidal actions in the 
Philippine ‘war on drugs’ (2016 – present) dehumanized poor people, 
delegitimized their human rights claims, and systematically killed at 
least 12,000 civilians (Regilme, 2020; Simangan, 2018). Those state 
actions suggest the glaring patterns of illiberal practices of the Duterte 
regime. Two years after he assumed presidency, Duterte publicly con-
fessed: “my only sin is extrajudicial killings” (Ellis-Petersen, 2018, 2). 
Although his official spokesperson later on remarked that Duterte was 
just being “playful” and therefore the latter’s words should “not be taken 
literally”, Human Rights Watch Asia Director Brad Adams contended 
that the remarks “should erase any doubt about the culpability of the 
president” (Ellis-Petersen, 2018, 6–7). On procedural features, the 
Duterte regime has continued to defy the sanctity of liberal constitu-
tional principles, particularly the 1987 Philippine Constitution — the 
same constitutional framework that emerged right after the 1986 People 
Power Revolution, which facilitated the collapse of the two-decade old 
dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. As such, Duterte “uses social media to 
tarnish opponents, deploying an army of internet trolls to pounce on 
anybody who publicly criticizes him, a move that serves to intimidate 
those who have not yet spoken out” (Bernstein, 2020, p. 11). Duterte’s 
authoritarian practices included jailing opposition leaders for their 
principled political dissent (e.g. Senator Leila de Lima), harassing in-
dependent media outlets and critical journalists (e.g. the forced closure 
of ABS-CBN, which is the country’s largest media company, and fabri-
cated legal charges against Rappler as the influential web-based news 
agency founded by another staunch Duterte critic, Maria Ressa), and 
persistently diluting the autonomy of the judicial and executive 
branches as constitutionally mandated constraints on executive power 
(e.g. the unjust impeachment of Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria 
Lourdes Sereno and systematic pressures to eliminate opposition forces 
in the Senate and the House of Representatives). 
Reflecting upon Koch’s views (2013, 391), which argues that “much 
social science scholarship has historically (and frequently only implic-
itly) assumed a mode of conceptualising power and politics along a 
certain continuum, in which ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ polities are con-
ceptualised as the opposite of ‘illiberal’ or ‘authoritarian’/‘despotic’ 
polities.”, I maintain that a more careful and pragmatic analytic use of 
such social scientific terms is necessary in this case. First, the bi-
furcations illiberal/liberal and authoritarian/democratic are useful in 
capturing a regime’s procedural politics and ideational beliefs, which 
constitutes a focus on a holistic analysis of a given regulative order. 
Second, the commonly invoked notion of ‘populism’ appears 
conceptually thin in capturing the complexity of Duterte’s politics. Cas 
Mudde (2004, 543) offers the influential definition of populism as a 
thin-centered ideology, which posits that society is bifurcated between 
two distinctive and mutually hostile groups: the corrupt elite vs. the 
people. Accordingly, populist ideology prescribes for politics as the 
willful representation of the ‘general will’ of the people. In that con-
ceptual rendering, populist leaders can be far-right or far-left; illiberal or 
liberal; and, democrat or authoritarian (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 
4). Merely characterizing Duterte’s politics as populist does not neatly 
capture his ideological disposition and practices in ways that my clas-
sification of his regime as both illiberal and authoritarian does. 
There is indeed a rich area studies and political science literature on 
the state of Philippine politics under Duterte. That literature, however, 
has failed to appreciate that Duterte’s base of political support is more 
untenable and volatile than the claims of formidable public support 
often suggested by many local commentators and scholars. Curato 
(2016), for example, argued that Duterte’s success depended on his 
effective use of populist tactics, while the many (if not all) essays in the 
edited volume by Curato (2017) underscored the particular idiosyn-
crasies of Duterte without carefully highlighting the variation of 
Duterte’s support base over time and in distinctive geographical spaces. 
Montiel and Uyheng (2020) highlighted Duterte’s effective deployment 
of “public fear” and “salvific hope” in the public sphere, and they further 
suggested that such emotions may be unique to Global South populism. 
Similarly, Miller (2018) conducted a biographical examination and sit-
uated Duterte’s politics as populist, while Heydarian (2018) maintained 
that Duterte’s rise to power signaled a populist challenge against 
post-Marcos elite democracy. Teehankee (2016), in his comparative 
analysis of Duterte’s electoral victory vis-à-vis previous Philippine 
presidents, underscores the importance of “political time” and “agen-
cy-oriented” analysis in presidential politics. For some scholars, under-
standing the causes and consequences of Duterte’s politics to the broader 
constitutional order is a more important analytic endeavor, and rightly 
so. Dressel and Bonoan (2019) rightly characterized Duterte’s actions as 
unprecedented and destructive of the post-1987 constitutional order, 
while Croissant and Lorenz (2018) maintain that Duterte upholds an 
electoralist rather than a liberal-democratic view of politics. Simangan 
(2018), meanwhile, provided a compelling analysis how and under 
which conditions does Duterte’s war on drugs could be considered a 
genocide. Meanwhile, Mark Thompson (2016a&b;2017; 2019) suggests 
that the Duterte presidency represents a dramatic challenge to the lib-
eral reformist and human rights-focused agenda of the preceding Aquino 
administration. 
The role of space and territorialization as an analytic focus for un-
derstanding the formations and contestations of authoritarian politics 
unfortunately remains understudied1. This analytic gap is unfortunate, 
especially because political sociologists and geographers have long 
recognized the importance of socio-political transformation from the 
dynamic interactions of localizing and globalizing factors (Agnew, 2011, 
pp. 316–330; Jessop, 2012; Jones et al., 2004; Regilme, 2014a, 2014b). 
Thus, this article, with an innovative approach that underscores space as 
a core frame of analysis, contributes to relevant literatures on authori-
tarian politics, International Relations, and political geography. First, 
whereas previous studies on Duterte’s politics (and other so-called 
illiberal populist leaders in the Global South) usually focus on factors 
from within the nation-state, thereby deploying a ‘methodologically 
nationalist’ bias, I underscore the role of both domestic and trans-
national spheres as spaces for contestation and legitimation. My 
approach avoids methodological nationalism’s analytic weaknesses that 
persist in mainstream research on authoritarianism and democratization 
(Regilme 2014a&b). Glasius (2017, 180) underscores how methodo-
logically nationalist studies on authoritarianism unfortunately considers 
authoritarianism based on a conception of the state “as a collection of 
1 An exception, however, is the work of Levitsky and Way, 2010. 
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people to be governed, more than as a territorial entity”. Hence, Glasius 
(2018, 180) rightly argues that the “the authoritarian state approaches 
its populations abroad, and includes or excludes them, as subjects to be 
repressed and extorted, as clients to be co-opted, or as patriots to be 
discursively manipulated”. Second, as an understudied analytic frame, 
space offers a more nuanced territorial variation of contestations and 
legitimations of illiberal and authoritarian politics (Levitsky & Way, 
2010). This focus on spatial analysis builds on the nascent literatures in 
the social sciences that highlight the dynamic relationship between 
authoritarian practices and territorial space (Regilme, 2019b; Ozduzen, 
2019; Cole, 2019; Koch, 2017; Dalmasso et al., 2018; Saad-Filho & 
Boffo, 2020). 
My notion of space follows two dimensions. First, space pertains to 
the dimension of intersubjective relations where, as Massey (2005) argues, 
multiplicity and coexistence emerges through the fabrication of various 
modalities and identifications. Second, space refers to a communally 
imagined territorial boundary, such as a legislative district defined by a 
national constitutional order or a region such as Southeast Asia. In ef-
fect, thinking about space and power invokes questions about how a 
territorial unit —both its material and discursive (imagined 
dimensions)—constrains or enables particular political outcomes. That 
strategy provides insights about the structures of possibilities that could 
emerge based on the contingent and dynamic interactions of space, time, 
and other socio-economic factors. This integrated analysis of temporal, 
spatial, and socio-economic factors is analytically useful especially in 
the age of heightened global economic and political interdependence. 
Particularly, various global governance institutions and the increasing 
formations of transnational public sphere through widespread use of 
social media networks create tremendous opportunities for contesta-
tions of political claims and authority vis-à-vis the spatial differentials 
amongst competing actors. 
The opportunities for and outcomes of political contestations differ 
across various imagined territorial spaces. Jessop (2012) calls this 
approach of thinking about space and power as spatial imaginary, 
whereby a particular political territory is understood as the “co-con-
stitution by [of] discursive as well as material factors that give them a 
more or less coherent imagined identity and social structuration” (p. 
13). Thinking about space-power interactions involves two mutually 
co-constitutive elements of political realities: (1) ideational elements, 
through territorially bound, collective, and deliberative imaginations of 
political realities, and (2) material elements, through the differentiated 
endowments of legal rules, resources, and capacities of the state, civil 
society, and markets across various geographies. Take the case of Brexit 
and the United Kingdom’s persistent Euroscepticism. Those who voted 
to remain in the European Union (EU) primarily came from metropol-
itan London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, while voters from rural 
parts of the United Kingdom, especially in the West Midlands, delivered 
support for leaving the EU. For instance, using a human cartographic 
approach, Ballas, Dorling, and Hennig (2017) has shown that Brexit was 
motivated by socio-economic disparities and austerity policies as 
demonstrated by various geographical maps that indicate the relation-
ship between spatial position and socio-economic status. Thus, 
haphazard generalizations about the causes of particular national po-
litical outcomes could be avoided by disaggregating the nation-state 
through an analysis of variations of power distribution and political 
outcomes across space and historical time within and beyond a national 
territory. 
Methodologically, my spatially-oriented analysis of Duterte’s basis of 
support does not depend on the regular public approval surveys con-
ducted by Pulse Asia and the Social Weather Stations (SWS), which are 
the most influential survey organizations in the Philippines. Instead, I 
use the final and official electoral results of the 2016 and 2019 national 
elections as raw sources of analysis and bases for formulating inferences 
concerning Duterte’s political support base. There are two key reasons 
for this choice of evidentiary material. First, reliable social scientific 
research requires publicly accessible data sources, compelling 
justifications for its methods, and transparent disclosure of its funding 
sources. Yet, the datasets from SWS and Pulse Asia remain “as either 
confidential or proprietary and therefore not fit for public disclosure” 
(Palabrica, 2017, p. 11). Although reliable scientific research guarantees 
opportunities for public verification of data, electoral polls and public 
satisfaction ratings from SWS and Pulse Asia do not have that possibility 
for intensive public verification. As Palabrica (2017, 12) rightly argues, 
in the absence of public access to datasets, we are, unfortunately, forced 
to “have to take the research companies’ word at their face value and 
believe the survey results as presented”. Although they release the 
electoral polls and public satisfaction ratings of the incumbent Presi-
dent, those survey firms’ public announcements usually include aggre-
gated results (sometimes disaggregated based on regions), without 
extensive and compelling justifications for its data sources and notes on 
its funding sources. In fact, the SWS and Pulse Asia sometimes contradict 
each other on public satisfaction ratings of Duterte’s presidency (e.g. 
67% positive rating for Duterte according to the SWS that confirmed an 
18-pt drop vs 80% according to Pulse Asia that claimed a dramatic in-
crease based on the third quarter 2017 surveys). Thus, I avoid those 
methodological issues as there is no way that their results could be 
subjected to further verification by prospective researchers in ways that 
publicly accessible official electoral results can. Second, a large pro-
portion of academic and non-academic commentaries use those surveys 
to make claims about Duterte’s legitimacy, while there is a dearth of 
systematic comparative analysis of the results of the two national elec-
tions during Duterte’s tenure. Using electoral data provides better op-
portunities to make more meaningful inferences concerning the 
supposedly full spatial distribution of political support in ways that 
surveys (based on very small, supposedly representative samples) could 
not. 
The next section analyzes the spatial differentiations of political 
support for Duterte’s candidacy using the official results from the 2016 
and 2019 national elections, particularly by referring to the open-access 
information from two independent media news outlets: Rappler (2016, 
2019a) and GMA News (2016, 2019). In spatializing the transnational 
exercise of Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian practices, I investigate 
how justificatory discourses and mobilization of political support for 
illiberal and authoritarian regimes transcend national borders. Whereby 
other scholars call this politics of subjugation as ‘extraterritorial 
authoritarian power’ (Dalmasso et al., 2018), I call such practices 
instead as the transnational exercise of illiberal and authoritarian power 
— whereby the latter pertains to the international mobilization of po-
litical support for both anti-democratic and anti-human rights practices of 
an illiberal and authoritarian regime. Specifically, such a regime appeals 
for support from: (1) constituents (with formal citizenship status) and 
(2) the transnational public sphere, primarily to more powerful 
third-party states and groups. Such a regime instrumentalizes their 
formal citizens into mere tools that can be used to consolidate the power 
of illiberal and authoritarian regimes. Such regimes treat their diasporic 
individuals “as subjects or outlaws; as patriots or traitors; as clients and 
as brokers, but never as citizens” and penalize “regime critics … as 
subjects, to be repressed when rebellious” (Dalmasso et al., 2018, p. 96). 
Hence, I analyze the primary sources of transnational contestations and 
legitimations of the Duterte regime based on several case study vignettes 
from the Filipino diaspora as well as the 2016 voting patterns of regis-
tered overseas Filipino voters. 
3. 2016 national elections: Duterte’s ascent to power 
Similar to Indonesia and Japan, the Philippines is a relatively large 
archipelagic country, with at least 7640 islands. Next to Indonesia, the 
Philippines has the largest number of registered voters (61.8 million in 
2019) in Southeast Asia. The Philippine archipelago, in terms of the 
electoral map, constitutes several distinctive geographical regions, with 
varying sizes of voter populations. Considered as the national capital 
region with 16 constituent cities, Metro Manila is the largest region with 
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the highest number of eligible voters in 2016, with around 6.3 million 
registered voters. As the home province of the Duterte family and the 
country’s second most populated city, Davao City serves as the largest 
territory in terms of population of the Davao region, with 2.7 million 
registered voters. As the third most populated city in the country, Cebu 
City constitutes the vote-rich territory of Cebu region, in central Visayas 
that has 4.3 million registered voters. 
The 2016 national general elections, which took place on the 9th 
May, includes the contestations for seats in the executive and legislative 
branches of the government, including the much-coveted positions of 
president and vice-president. Unlike the US, where the elected president 
and vice-president come from the same political party, Filipino voters 
separately elect their preferred candidates for those positions. The 2016 
elections recorded 84% voter turn-out, which was the highest percent-
age of turn-out since automation was first introduced in 2010 and the 
second highest since the first post-Cold War election (at 86%). 
As shown in Fig. 1 above, the official results of the 2016 elections 
suggest several key insights. First, Duterte’s electoral support primarily 
emerged from the southern parts of the archipelago (Mindanao) and in 
Metro Manila. In the country’s capital, Duterte received 2.1 million 
votes (44%), while liberal-centrist frontrunners such as Grace Poe 
(995,000 or 21%), Mar Roxas (691,000 or 14%), Jojo Binay (670,000 or 
14%), and Miriam Defensor-Santiago (332, 814 or 7%) trailed behind. 
Duterte garnered the largest number of votes in 16 out of the 17 cities in 
Metro Manila, while then-Vice President Jojo Binay ranked first in 
Makati, where the latter served as the former mayor for at least two 
decades. Second, Mar Roxas’ support base is more widely distributed 
than Duterte’s bailiwick. Roxas emerged as the winner in some parts of 
Luzon (northern part of archipelago, including Palawan as the long and 
narrowly shaped island facing the South China Sea), majority of the 
Visayas region (central islands), and the two provinces in the Mindanao. 
Meanwhile, two other liberal candidates Grace Poe and Jojo Binay ob-
tained electoral victories in the northern provinces. Although Mar Roxas 
was the official candidate of the then incumbent President Benigno 
Aquino III’s Liberal Party, the three aforementioned rivals of Duterte 
appeared to have a relatively strong commitment to liberal democratic 
principles of the 1987 Constitution and a relatively pro-United States 
(US) foreign policy (see Fig. 2 below). 
Second, the majority of electoral provinces in the Luzon and Visayas 
regions overwhelmingly voted for liberal-centrist candidates, particu-
larly Roxas, Binay, and Poe. In addition to Metro Manila, the Ilocos re-
gion in the northernmost part of Luzon offers interesting results 
concerning Duterte’s contested legitimacy. The Ilocos region is the po-
litical bailiwick of the Marcos family — whose patriarch, Ferdinand 
Marcos, was the dictatorial leader known for his ill-gotten wealth and 
for being deposed in 1986 during the bloodless People Power Revolu-
tion. Yet, the Marcos family has been seeking to resurrect their political 
dynasty through the formation of alliances with politicians at the na-
tional level. Despite her clear commitment to traditional liberal demo-
cratic values, Poe has long been rumored to be the biological daughter of 
the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, but has denied that rumor and reaf-
firmed her background as the adopted daughter of a famous action star 
and a well-known drama actor. Senator Grace Poe topped the poll in 3 of 
the 4 provinces in the Ilocos Region: Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pan-
gasinan. Although Duterte won the support of Ilocos Norte, Senator 
Grace Poe ranked first in three of the provinces in the Ilocos region, 
particularly Ilocus Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan. A well-known ally of 
the Marcos family, Duterte enjoyed the political support of voters in 
Ilocos Norte. In Ilocos Norte, Duterte got a mere 34% of the votes, while 
his three liberal-centrist candidates (Roxas, Poe, Binay) received 20% 
each of the shares of total number of votes. Yet, the Ilocos region is 
indeed quite a large electoral district. Once a longtime mayor in Mind-
anao with no national political credentials, Duterte faced initial diffi-
culty in garnering support beyond Mindanao and the support from 
influential political brokers such as the Marcos clan in Ilocos region 
proved to be necessary. In some vote-rich parts of the Visayas region, 
including Cebu, Duterte received 50% of the votes, while the votes for 
Roxas (27%) and Poe (12%) did not suffice to undermine Duterte’s bid 
therein. 
In Mindanao, the southernmost island group and the perceived 
bailiwick of the Duterte clan, the electoral results suggest a more 
contentious if not weak support for Duterte’s presidential bid. In Davao 
City, where Rodrigo Duterte served for more than three decades as 
Mayor, Vice-Mayor, and Member of Congress, only 38.6% of the total 
number of votes were registered for Duterte, while Roxas (23.4%), Poe 
(22%), and Binay (13%) received quite substantial vote shares too. If the 
vote shares of the three liberal-centrist candidates were to be combined 
(around 58.4%), then Duterte would have lost the support from his 
fellow residents in Davao. Moreover, the 2016 electoral results from 
Mindanao suggest a much more variegated and fragmented political 
support for Duterte’s presidential bid. Whereas Lanao del Sur over-
whelmingly delivered 81% of the total number of votes for Duterte in 
addition to Bukidnon with 59%, other large provincial regions therein 
Fig. 1. Philippine Presidential Elections Provincial Results Distribution 2016. 
This image is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 
International license. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2016_Philippine_presidenti 
al_election_provincial_results.png 
Notes: Absentee voters can be classified into three categories: (1) local voters 
reside in the Philippines but do not have a permanent residence due to the 
mobile nature of their work such as media personnel, military, civilian state 
workers etc.; (2) detainee voters are those are in prison; (3) and, overseas voters 
residing outside the Philippines. 
S.S.F. Regilme Jr.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Political Geography 89 (2021) 102427
6
did not approve Duterte’s bid and supported instead Liberal Party’s Mar 
Roxas. In Agusan del Sur, Roxas registered 52% of the votes, while 
Duterte only got 41%. Later on, however, Agusan del Sur’s influential 
local political clans, which previously supported Roxas, would shift their 
support to Duterte. Right after the 2016 elections, provincial officials 
jumped ship to Duterte’s PDP-Laban party and “had nothing but good 
words and praises for Duterte” (Avendano, 2018, pp. 6–7). In Zam-
boanga del Norte, liberal-centrist candidates Roxas (39%) and Poe 
(12%) diluted the expected consolidated political support for Duterte, 
who only received 38.9%. In Misamis Occidental, Roxas emerged as the 
clear winner with 49% of the votes, while Duterte only received 40%. 
The 2016 spatially-based electoral data suggest the following 
tentative findings. First, Duterte’s uneven electoral win across various 
electoral provinces illustrate his campaign’s careful coalition-building 
with the ruling political clans in those particular provinces rather than 
a clear and consolidated public support for Duterte’s anti-liberal dem-
ocratic platform. Second, the electoral victories for individual liberal 
front-runner candidates, particularly Roxas, Binay, and Poe, indirectly 
suggest a quite substantial support for liberal democratic policy agenda. 
If those votes for the three liberal front-runners were to be added 
together, then Duterte’s path to the presidency may had been deterred. 
Thus, it is likely that Duterte’s electoral victory primarily emerged from 
the disintegration of electoral support for liberal and relatively pro-
gressive politicians. 
Duterte’s electoral victory emerged primarily from the country’s 
largest urban metropolitan areas —particularly Metro Manila, Davao 
City, and Cebu City. The Duterte campaign highlighted the need for a 
leader who can effectively promote peace and order amidst the 
perceived increasing crime rates as the key cause for political instability 
and uneven economic growth. Although David (2016, 8) argued that 
Duterte called for the rejection of a supposed urban elitism of 
Manila-based politicians may have galvanized substantial support 
beyond his hometown, it is likely that voters in urban areas find 
Duterte’s alleged mayoral track record in Davao (low crime rates, good 
infrastructure, and peace and order) as compelling evidence for his 
ability to address the perceived increasing crime rates and traffic situ-
ation in Metro Manila and Cebu as well (Cook & Salazar, 2016, p. 5; The 
Economist, 2020). As shown in Fig. 1, the considerable support for 
Duterte from Mindanao and the major urban regions suggests the 
effectiveness of his campaign for intensified state violence. That likely 
resonated well amongst urban voters, as “Duterte has wooed voters by 
portraying himself as the panacea to crime, drugs and corruption” 
(Campbell, 2016, p. 8). 
4. 2019 mid-term elections: Duterte’s consolidation of power 
Three years since Duterte started his presidency, the 2019 midterm 
elections demonstrated the geographical and institutional distribution 
of political support for the administration. Around thousands of candi-
dates contested the 18,071 elective posts during the midterm elections. 
Fig. 2. Policy Platforms and Human Rights Credentials of 2016 Presidential Candidates (author’s illustration).  
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The legislative branch consists of two chambers. The Senate (upper 
chamber) comprises of 24 seats, whereby 12 of those were open for 
national contestation during the 2019 elections through simple majority 
vote of the top 12 candidates, while the House of Representatives (lower 
chamber) includes at least 245 Representative positions, each of which 
is elected through simple majority vote in each electoral district in the 
Philippines, and several other representatives nominated by winning 
party-lists coming from various sectoral groups. All of the 245 seats in 
the lower chamber were open for contestation during the 2019 midterm 
elections. 
This section addresses the question on how and under which con-
ditions did the Duterte administration consolidate its power across the 
country and within various competing branches of the Philippine state. 
Based on the 2019 midterm electoral results, especially in the legislative 
branch, as well as the Duterte administration’s machinations to influ-
ence the other branches of the state, this section offers several tentative 
insights that suggest Duterte’s mechanisms for regime consolidation. 
First, various key developments in party politics illustrate the ways 
that consolidated the Duterte regime during its first three years in 
power. Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections under the 
PDP-Laban political party, which only had 2 Congress members (Koko 
Pimentel in the Senate and Lino Cayetano in the House of Representa-
tives) before Duterte’s emergence in the national campaign. Because of 
the electoral success of Duterte, PDP-Laban gained 125 members in the 
House of Representatives during the first year of Duterte’s term, thereby 
constituting almost 51% of all members. At that time, PDP-Laban gained 
the support of the Nacionalista Party and formed a grand coalition with 
other smaller political parties that are allied to Duterte (Cepeda, 2020). 
As of February 2020, almost one year after the midterm elections, the 
PDP-Laban coalition, however, lost some traction in the House of Rep-
resentatives by only having 62 incumbent legislative members, as the 
other members eventually shifted to the National Unity Party (NUP) and 
the Lakas- Christian Muslim Democrats Party (Lakas-CMD). The mem-
bers of the NUP and Lakas-CMD do not constitute the inner circle of the 
Duterte regime. It is likely that the decreased membership in the 
PDP-Laban signals lawmakers’ strategic move in demonstrating condi-
tional support for Duterte (by being publicly seen as supportive of the 
coalition) but also securing some form of insurance for political survival 
in case Duterte’s popularity dwindles by the end of his presidential term 
in 2022. In the Senate, meanwhile, no opposition candidate from the 
“Otso Diretso” progressive coalition (8 anti-Duterte and 
liberal-progressive opposition candidates) made it into the top 12 can-
didates, who are eligible to take the 12 vacant seats. As the frontrunner 
of the opposition coalition, Liberal Party candidate and incumbent 
Senator at that time, Bam Aquino secured only the 14th spot, with 14.1 
million votes (300,000 votes short from the ranked 12th candidate). As a 
former presidential candidate and Liberal Party head, Mar Roxas expe-
rienced a disappointing loss by being merely ranked 16th (9.6 million 
votes) in the Senate elections. The electoral support for Roxas and 
Aquino were sparsely distributed in various regions of the archipelago, 
but a substantial majority came from traditional Liberal Party bailiwicks 
such as the Bicol region and some parts of the northwestern half of the 
Visayas region. Two independent and non-Duterte allied candidates — 
Grace Poe and Nancy Binay — bid again for senatorial elections (as their 
terms ended by 2019) and emerged victorious as part of the top 12 
candidates. Poe — one of Duterte’s strongest contenders in the 2016 
elections — enjoyed 46.58% of the votes (22 million votes), while Nancy 
Binay (daughter of former Vice-President Jojo Binay under the recent 
Aquino administration) ranked 12th, with 14.5 million votes. As an in-
dependent candidate and former movie star, Lito Lapid secured the 7th 
spot, with 16.9 million votes. Despite Duterte’s well-oiled political 
machinery and persistent political harassment of the opposition, the 
victory of independent candidates, especially Poe and Binay (who are 
both critics of the ‘war on drugs’), suggests that Duterte’s authoritarian 
agenda does not have full nationwide support. Despite the very few 
high-ranking legislators who are outspoken critics of Duterte’s poor 
human rights record, the majority of the Senators and Members of the 
House of Representatives likely chose to cooperate with Duterte’s allies 
out of fear of political retaliation, including the deprivation of easy ac-
cess to the national budget that may be used for projects in the legisla-
tors’ respective electoral districts. This fear of retaliation was 
demonstrated by the widely-televised November 2019 interview of 
Duterte-allied House Member Joey Salceda, who claimed that the cur-
rent government is “authoritarian” and asserted that “it’s like with us 
congressmen, we vote as the President wishes out of fear of him”. When 
pressed by Karen Davila, the well-known progressive journalist, to 
clarify his statement, Salceda responded: “Authoritarian … authorita-
tive … decisive is the better word. Ikaw talaga pinapahamak mo ko! 
(You’re putting me in danger!)”. After perhaps realizing that the term 
‘authoritarian’ could earn him the ire of Duterte, Salceda quickly used 
the adjective ‘decisive’ as a more benign term for describing the gov-
ernment (Cepeda, 2019, 11). 
Salceda’s remarks suggest a much wider pattern of various political 
parties’ conditional support for the incumbent president’s political 
party. As shown in Fig. 3 below, the Duterte-led PDP Laban maintains 
varying degrees of support from the various national political parties 
except the Liberal Party. In 2018, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte 
(daughter of President Duterte) established the HNP (‘Coalition for 
Change’) party and later on led the ousting of Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Pantaleon Alvarez, who is a key ally of the President 
and a prominent leader of the PDP Laban party. The feud between some 
key members of the PDP Laban and the HNP suggests the shaky foun-
dations of the President’s grand coalition of political parties. In 2016, 
Fig. 3. 2019 Philippine House of Representatives Elections 
This image is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 
International license. 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2019_Philippine_House_of_ 
Representatives_Elections.svg. 
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before the national elections, the Liberal Party constituted the majority 
of the House of Representatives with 116 members (out of 297), while 
Duterte’s presidential victory eventually pushed many LP elected rep-
resentatives to shift temporarily their allegiance to Duterte’s grand 
coalition that includes Lakas and NUP parties. This persistent alliance 
shifting illustrates the long-standing norm amongst local politicians, 
who easily deflect to the winning president’s side (Thompson, 2016a, p. 
52). Because of the potential losses in budgetary support of the central 
government to their home provinces in case of appearing as supportive 
to the losing presidential candidate, House of Representatives members 
usually tend to show their support for the incumbent President. As 
shown by Fig. 3, Duterte’s own party, PDP Laban, does not have an 
overwhelming support across many provinces, and it has to rely on a 
provisional alliance with Congress members. 
Second, Duterte has enjoyed conditional support from the country’s 
most influential political dynasties and extremely rich families in 
various key regions of the country and has systematically challenged 
non-allied economic elites. In Luzon, Duterte enjoyed the political sup-
port from the Marcos family in the Ilocos region as well as the Cayetano, 
Villar, and Estrada political clans based in Metro Manila. In Luzon, 
Duterte’s legitimacy has been contested by the Aquino and Binay po-
litical clans, both of which are known for their liberal democratic 
commitments that gained traction after the 1986 People Power Revo-
lution. Similarly, in the Visayas region, the Osmeña family in Cebu has 
an ongoing political feud with the Duterte family, despite the fact that 
the political career of Duterte’s father benefitted from the initial polit-
ical support of Sergio Osmeña Sr. in the late 1940s. Another source of 
Duterte’s contested legitimacy comes from the perceived threat posed by 
extremely rich families that are generally known for their liberal and 
progressive causes. For instance, the Metro Manila-based Ayala family, 
with a net worth of approximately 3.1 billion USD, and Manny Pan-
gilinan, with a net worth of 5.9 billion USD, have faced threats and 
bullying from Duterte, who forcibly demanded to sell their majority 
shares in the country’s largest water distribution companies (ABS-CBN, 
2019). Duterte and his allies have promoted the idea that the Ayala 
family and Manny Pangilinan constitute the liberal opposition that 
threatens the legitimacy of his administration. 
The Duterte administration succeeded in weakening the influence of 
the Lopez family, which is allied to more progressive political factions in 
the Philippines, particularly by coercively shutting down ABS-CBN 
Corporation (the country’s largest media giant) in two ways. The first 
mechanism pertains to the weaponization of the executive government’s 
regulatory powers, when the National Telecommunications Commission 
issued on May 2020 a cease-and-desist order that mandated the termi-
nation of all broadcasting operations on the basis of the expiry of its 25- 
year Congress-approved operation franchise. The second mechanism 
consists of the eventual denial of a new legislative franchise on July 
2020, when 70 Duterte-backed Congress members voted against ABS- 
CBN’s application to operate (while 11 legislators supported approval). 
The closure of ABS-CBN symbolizes an attempt to weaken political 
dissent against Duterte and press freedom, especially with the disap-
pearance of a media conglomerate that has the widest reach nationwide 
(free-to-air national TV and 19 radio stations across the archipelago). 
Duterte asserted that he was “very happy” because he “dismantled the 
oligarchy” in the country “without declaring Martial Law” (Aurelio, 
2020). Duterte later on referred to several extremely wealthy Filipinos 
(Ayala family, Consunji family, Lopez family, and Manuel Pangilinan) as 
targets of his so-called ‘dismantling process’ of the oligarchy. Duterte 
sought to challenge the business interests of these widely perceived 
liberal elites, considering that extremely rich Filipino individuals, 
especially those that are based in Metro Manila, have been perceived as 
pivotal in toppling previous presidencies of Marcos and Estrada. The 
so-called “People Power Revolutions”, which constituted large-scale 
protests in the EDSA district of Metro Manila, toppled the Marcos 
dictatorship in 1986 and the short-lived presidency of Estrada in 2001. 
The Duterte administration distinguished itself from its post-Marcos era 
predecessors by weaponizing the legal system and by deploying the state 
bureaucracy to harass journalists and independent media organizations 
(Pangue, 2020). 
Third, political opposition members and various critics within and 
beyond the state apparatus have experienced bullying and persecution 
from the Duterte administration. In the judicial branch, the Duterte 
administration succeeded in impeaching Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Maria Lourdes Sereno, who was a staunch critic of the war on drugs. In 
the Senate, several opposition members have faced curses, threats, and 
bullying on national television from Duterte and his political allies. 
Senator Leila de Lima, who is Duterte’s most prominent critic and 
former chair of Commission on Human Rights, was sent to jail on the 
basis of legal complaints, which were widely perceived as fabricated by 
the Duterte government. Beyond the state apparatus, various journalists 
have also suffered under the Duterte regime. In fact, since the start of 
Duterte’s term until December 2019, state agents have allegedly killed 
15 journalists, while many journalists have experienced online harass-
ment, libel cases, murder attempts, and exclusion from coverage (Rap-
pler, 2019). Many state-initiated killings of journalists reportedly 
occurred in various parts of Mindanao, and a lot of these media agents 
were local journalists and student reporters covering the war on drugs 
(Barrera, 2017; Ranada, 2017; Tusalem, 2019). In June 2020, a Manila 
court convicted Maria Ressa, the founder of the online news site Rappler, 
of cyber-libel — a court decision that is widely seen as a deliberate 
attempt of Duterte’s systematic repression of press freedom. Respected 
for its high-quality journalism, Ressa’s Rappler has been known for its 
in-depth coverage of corruption and human rights abuses of the Duterte 
regime. 
5. Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian politics in the 
transnational sphere 
Another space for contestation of Duterte’s illiberal and authori-
tarian agenda pertains to the global public sphere, where strategic 
partnerships with other supportive transnational actors are made. There 
are two key motivations that facilitate transnational coalition-building: 
(1) mobilization of support by a powerful state that uphold fairly similar 
legitimating principles and political practices with that of the Duterte 
regime and (2) the suppression of criticisms from other states and 
transnational actors. 
President Duterte introduced a transformative agenda in Philippine 
foreign policy. During the early phase of his presidency, while publicly 
expressing his admiration for Adolf Hitler’s genocidal policies, Duterte 
has expressed his personal disdain of the European Union, the United 
Nations, Pope Francis, the United States, and other key world actors that 
pressure the Philippine government to comply with its commitments to 
human rights, multilateralism, and democratic governance. 
The Duterte administration has forged closer bilateral relations with 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, while sidelining more than a half-century 
old Mutual Defence Treaty-based alliance with Washington DC and 
cordial relations with consolidated liberal democracies in the Global 
North (Coronel, 2019; McCoy, 2016). One possible explanation for that 
shift pertains to the suspicion that continuing the close bilateral re-
lations with the US could potentially challenge the legitimacy of the 
Duterte government. By winning the support of Beijing, the Duterte 
administration strategically deflects criticisms from more progressive 
factions within the US government, especially Democratic members in 
the legislative branch. Despite the Trump administration’s blatant 
disinterest in the human rights record of America’s strategic allies 
(Regilme 2019), US civil society actors and Democratic Party politicians 
have been consistent in criticizing Duterte’s war on drugs for its wide-
spread human rights abuses. In fact, US Democrat Senators Patrick 
Leahy and Dick Durbin led the successful resolution in the 2020 budget 
that mandates the US State Department to deny the entry to the US of 
any Philippine official who is responsible for the political harassment of 
prominent critics such as Senator Leila De Lima and renowned journalist 
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Maria Ressa. Eventually approved by Trump, the resolution led to the 
invocation of the Global Magnitsky Act 2016 that empowers the US 
government’s executive branch to implement travel and visa entry re-
strictions on any officially recognized human rights violators abroad in 
entering US territory. 
Despite the consistently favorable image of the US amongst the 
Filipino public, as evidenced by the Pew Research (2020) surveys in the 
last 10 years, Duterte defied that public sentiment by persistently 
demonizing the US as the Philippines’ former colonizer. During the early 
months of his term, Duterte made an official visit to Xi Jinping and 
delivered the following remarks in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People: 
“Your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United 
States … both in military, but also economics … I will be dependent on 
you” (Mollman, 2016, p. 8). After US President Obama expressed his 
concerns on the human rights violations emerging from the war on 
drugs, Duterte quickly branded Obama as a “son of a bitch” and prom-
ised that: “I will not go to America anymore. We will just be insulted 
there … So time to say goodbye my friend.” (Blanchard, 2016, pp. 
25–28). Those remarks demonstrate Duterte’s attempts to delegitimize 
the US as the potential supporter of anti-Duterte activists and critics 
within and beyond the Philippines. The increasingly cordial 
Philippines-China bilateral relations have emerged amidst the over-
whelmingly strong domestic public support for the Philippine govern-
ment to defend its claims for territorial ownership in some parts of the 
so-called South China Sea (SCS, or partly the West Philippine Sea). 
Duterte, in his cordial relations with Beijing, has been reluctant from 
invoking the 2016 legal victory in the Philippines v. China case, whereby 
The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration junked Beijing’s 
claims for territorial ownership in the highly disputed SCS maritime area 
(Regilme, 2018b). Duterte may have deemed it more prudent to seek the 
political support from Beijing, even if he encountered the Filipino 
public’s strong support for the Philippine state’s territorial claims in the 
SCS. That public resistance against China, from Duterte’s perspective, 
could be silenced anyway through domestic state repression (such as 
curtailing critical media outlets), but mobilizing transnational support 
for his regime may require a more powerful but supportive state that 
could subvert transnational coalitions of resistance against the human 
rights abuses and failed policies in the Philippines. Those dissident co-
alitions include the European Union, and the Democrat-controlled US 
Congress (and more recently the Biden administration), and other in-
ternational human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch. 
The Duterte regime has remained steadfast in undermining global 
governance institutions and transnational actors that resist his illiberal 
and authoritarian politics. In 2019, Duterte benefitted from Beijing’s 
diplomatic clout in order to quash the United Nations Human Rights 
Council’s resolution to investigate the human rights situation in the 
Philippines. Led by Iceland, that resolution eventually passed (18 
affirmative, 14 negative), thereby demonstrating the limits of Chinese 
influence in multilateral governance and undermining Duterte’s foolish 
claim that Iceland’s initiative emerged because “they have nothing to 
eat in Iceland but ice” (Bello, 2019, p. 2). In addition, the Duterte regime 
exerted so much effort to derail the initiatives to bring his human rights 
abuses during the ‘war on drugs’ to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The Philippines was one of the early supporters of the 1998 Rome 
Statute, which is the legal basis for the establishment of the ICC. The 
Duterte administration formally withdrew the country’s membership 
therein on March 17, 2019, after the ICC started its ‘preliminary ex-
amination’ on the Philippines case on February 2018. This withdrawal 
constituted Duterte’s strategic response against the ongoing preliminary 
examination of the abuses committed during the war on drugs. The 
ongoing case in the ICC came after Filipino lawyer Jude Sabio filed in 
2017 a 77-page document (“official communication”) asking to build the 
case against Duterte for his pivotal role in extrajudicial killings in the 
drug wars. Consequently, Fatou Bensouda, the ICC prosecutor, has 
started the ‘preliminary examination’ on the Philippine situation to 
determine whether the case merits further investigation (and eventually 
prosecution). In January 2020, Sabio sent another letter to the ICC, 
whereby he officially withdrew his claims in the 2017 document and 
asked to stop the ongoing investigations (Santos & Gregorio, 2020). 
Sabio claimed that the 2017 ICC official communication was “just part of 
the political propaganda” of former Senator Antonio Trillanes IV (a 
prominent anti-Duterte politician), who employed Sabio for legal ser-
vices in the case of Edgar Matobato (a self-confessed participant of the 
‘Davao Death Squad’) whose testimonies were included in the corre-
spondence to the ICC (Esguerra, 2020). Meanwhile, Trillanes and other 
political opposition members maintained that Duterte’s allies may have 
had coerced Sabio to retract his support for the ICC case, considering 
that it was widely reported that Sabio received death threats in 2017, or 
as soon as he filed the official communication to the ICC. Sabio’s 
retraction and the Philippines’ membership withdrawal from the ICC 
suggest how Duterte has weaponized domestic and international legal 
systems in pursuit of two key goals: (1) delegitimization of international 
human rights principles and institutions as well as state accountability to 
its citizens, and (2) repression of political opposition by weakening 
domestic and transnational political dissenters. 
The ICC, however, dismissed Sabio’s withdrawal, asserted its juris-
diction over Duterte despite the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute, and continued with the ‘preliminary examination’ of the case, as 
of July 2020. Similar to Duterte’s loss in the UNHCR resolution, The 
Hague-based ICC’s ongoing examination of the Philippines’ human 
rights situation continues to serve as a source for transnational contes-
tation against illiberal and authoritarian politics, in general, and the 
Duterte regime, in particular. Renowned Filipino human rights lawyer 
Chel Diokno raised the possibility of Duterte’s arrest in any ICC-member 
state, despite the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute (CNN 
Philippines, 2019). It appears that Duterte fully understands such a risk 
thereby limiting his official visits since 2016 to Asia-Pacific countries as 
well as Peru and Russia, and he has never attempted to visit any country 
in Western Europe, where his illiberal and authoritarian politics 
attracted strong opposition amongst European leaders. Remarkably, 
Duterte remains determined in quashing international human rights 
groups that are very critical of the human rights abuses in the 
Philippines. On August 16, 2017, Duterte accused human rights activists 
of “obstructing justice” and ordered the Philippine National Police to 
“shoot those who are part of [drug activity]. If they [members of human 
rights organizations] are obstructing justice, you shoot them” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2017, p. 1). In addition to targeting domestic human 
rights activists, such threats aim to intimidate international human 
rights advocates (including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Inter-
national) as well as foreign journalists, who are determined to investi-
gate the causes and consequences of Duterte’s abuses. 
Leading the Philippines as having one of the world’s largest source 
country of migrant workers (Regilme, 2013; Tyner, 2004), the Duterte 
regime systematically mobilized political support from the Filipino 
diaspora and repressed political dissent abroad. Since the 2016 electoral 
campaign, the Duterte regime has employed a “keyboard army” of 
around 400 to 500 individuals, who are tasked “to spread propaganda 
for presidential candidate Duterte during the election” and to “spread 
and amplify messages in support of his policies now he’s in power” 
(Bradshaw & Howard, 2017, p. 15; Williams, 2017). Duterte reportedly 
admitted in July 2017 that his political party (PDP-Laban) paid at least 
10 million PhP (200,000 USD) for a social media campaign that defen-
ded him against critics and promoted him in various social media net-
works (Bencito, 2017). Various well-known critics (TV celebrities, 
journalists, and opposition politicians) of the Duterte administration 
have been harassed by Duterte’s “cyber-troll armies” (Dumlao, 2020). 
Many overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) have left the country due to 
political discontent and economic insecurity at home. Perhaps that is the 
likely reason why Duterte’s “keyboard army” has been apparently 
effective in inciting support from OFWs, many of whom rely heavily on 
social media networks as they have limited access to a wider range of 
credible news sources. Duterte’s “keyboard army” aims to demonize 
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liberal democratic politics and their prominent supporters in the coun-
try. Consequently, the 2016 overseas absentee voting results delivered 
an overwhelming victory for Rodrigo Duterte with 313, 346 votes out of 
the 432, 706 votes (Hegina, 2016). While Duterte’s troll armies may 
have been successful with OFWs, local Filipino residents have a much 
wider access to various credible news outlets, including the multimedia 
giant ABS-CBN network that has been critical of the government. Many 
online dissenters and celebrity activists who oppose Duterte, however, 
appear to have been gaining traction, as demonstrated by the intensified 
resistance against the failed policies of the government in handling the 
COVID-19 pandemic as well as the Duterte-induced closure of the TV 
and radio broadcast operations of ABS-CBN network (Hapal, 2020). 
Amidst the COVID19 pandemic, the country’s most prominent actors 
and celebrities have mobilized their fans online to report or block 
pro-Duterte “online trolls” who spread fake news about the pandemic 
and delegitimize press freedom. Those coordinated actions were 
orchestrated through the creation of two very prominent hashtags: 
#WeBlockAsOne and #StarveTheTrolls, both of which emerged as top 
national trends on Twitter. In addition, ABS-CBN’s closure represents 
Duterte’s attempt to reduce the power of independent journalism in the 
transnational public sphere. Specifically, ABS-CBN owns The Filipino 
Channel, which is the only global media network exclusively catering to 
millions of Filipinos abroad. 
The Duterte regime exercises its authoritarian power and promotes 
its illiberal views over its subjects abroad by suppressing political dissent 
of critical Filipino workers. For instance, Elanel Ordidor, a Taiwan-based 
Filipino caregiver, has been very active on social media, particularly in 
posting critical commentaries about the abuses and policy failures of the 
Duterte regime (Gotinga, 2020). As such, the Philippine Department of 
Labor and Employment (through its labour attaché based in Taipei) 
formally asked the Taiwanese government to deport Ordidor for the 
crime of cyber-libel. Harry Roque, Duterte’s spokesperson, responded 
that Taiwan is part of China and that Taipei should immediately deport 
Ordidor. The Taiwanese government insisted that it is a sovereign 
country and respects freedom of speech as its core principles. To save his 
regime from further public outcry, Duterte shied away from directly 
commenting about the case and shifted the blame to the individual 
mistake of the labour attaché, while Ordidor remains in Taiwan as of 
April 2020. 
6. Conclusion 
The case study of Duterte contributes important insights to the 
disciplinary fields of political geography, comparative politics, and In-
ternational Relations. First, it introduces preliminary findings from the 
use of spatial approach in understanding the patterns of contestations and 
legitimations of illiberal and authoritarian politics. In political science, 
whereas comparative politics scholars often focus on the causes and 
consequences of key political processes within the nation-state, Inter-
national Relations scholars, meanwhile, methodologically highlight the 
transnational dynamics of political transformations. Alternatively, I 
show how both transnational and domestic spaces, as structural condi-
tions, generate as well as discredit illiberal and authoritarian politics. 
Second, this study bridges the nascent literatures on authoritarian and 
illiberal politics from geography and political science, thereby demon-
strating the importance of how physical and imagined space structures 
the range of constraints and possibilities for transformative political 
actions. Thus, spatializing illiberal and authoritarianism requires the 
identification of contesting political actors and tracing how those 
transformative processes generate incumbent leaders’ legitimacy (or the 
lack thereof) over time. 
I examined how the contestations and legitimation efforts of 
Duterte’s illiberal and authoritarian regime emerged from various local, 
national, and transnational spaces. Contrary to the popular yet simplistic 
characterizations of Duterte’s uncontested public support amongst Fil-
ipinos, I showed that the electoral victory of Duterte in 2016 cannot be 
fully attributed to an overwhelming public approval of an illiberal and 
authoritarian agenda. Rather, the total number of votes for anti- 
authoritarian candidates splintered amongst three candidates, thereby 
suggesting a substantial public support for an alternative liberal demo-
cratic agenda, at least at that time. Although the 2019 midterm elections 
meant a historic loss for all the opposition candidates in the Senate, the 
victory of three independent candidates — two of whom are outspoken 
advocates of human rights (Poe and Binay)— showcased the remaining 
viability of liberal democracy in the country. That remaining electoral 
support for liberal democratic candidates is remarkable despite the 
government’s massive propaganda campaign that demonizes constitu-
tional democracy, glorifies the Marcos dictatorship, and publicly vilifies 
peaceful dissent against state-initiated human rights abuses. Hence, one 
way of enriching our understanding of illiberal and authoritarian poli-
tics pertains to schematizing how contestations of such politics vary 
across territorial scales and units. The prospects of political survival of 
Duterte’s authoritarian regime does not only depend on local support, 
but also through the persistent delegitimation of human rights advocacy 
from the European Union and the US and by seeking the support of 
similar illiberal and authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China. 
Thus, it is likely that the potential success of restoring liberal democratic 
politics in the Philippines does not only depend on homegrown, local-
ized, and persistent opposition from within the country, but also through 
transnational coalition-building that are supportive of local opposition 
groups. 
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